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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
They would hold that any proof of a payment after the issuance of the
subpoena, was a prima facie violation of the injunction, and that Psaty had
failed to overcome this presumption. However, upon considering the provision
of Section 779, which requires an affidavit from the judgment creditor showing
that he has reason to believe that the third party has property of the debtor,
before a subpoena can issue, it appears that the judgment creditor should be
required to prove these allegations in a contempt action. This would appear to
argue against a prima faie violation by payment.
The rationale of the majority in applying basic contract principles, appears
to have reached a just result which is in keeping with the purpose of Section
781. It is evident from the facts that there is no property of the debtor in the
third party's hands, and that no arrangement subsequent to Monarch's default
created an obligation owing to Monarch. Monarch appears to have been merely
an agent of Psaty, rather than an independant contractor.
RIGHT OF REDEMPTION AFTER TAX SALE

Title to the real property in dispute was held by the estate of Emma
Gerow. 15 Since the 1949-50 taxes were not paid on the land, the property
was sold at a tax sale, the defendant having possession of the tax certificate
resulting from that sale. Within three years from the date of the sale,
plaintiff, desiring to buy the property, paid, and the County Treasurer accepted, the full payment required to redeem these premises from the tax
sale. 16 Thereafter, plaintiff obtained title to the property in question from
the estate of Emma Gerow, and brought this action pursuant to Article
15 of the Real Property Law to quiet title.17 The Supreme Court, Suffolk
County entered judgment against deferidant, which was affirmed by the
Appellate Division, and the Court of Appeals by a unanimous vote.
There are two types of statutes that have dealt with the above problem.
One uses the words, as to who may redeem, "the owner, occupant, or any
other person having an interest in any real estate sold for taxes...." The other
is essentially the same, albeit the words "having an interest in any real estate
sold for taxes" are omitted.' 8 As to an interpretation of the latter, one may not
redeem who is a complete stranger to the land.' 9 Only a person having or
claiming in good faith to have an interest in the property is entitled to that
right.20 However, this has been qualified somewhat to permit a redemption by
one having no interest, but the result of this places title not in he who has
redeemed, but in the original owner, who may later take advantage of the
15. Johnson v. Stein, 6 N.Y.2d 413, 189 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1959).
16. Section 49 of the SuFmoLK CouNTm TAx Acr provides for the redemption of any
real estate sold for taxes by the owner or any person interested in the property within
thirty-six months after the date of the tax sale.
17. An action under Article 15 of the N.Y. REA PRop. LAw compels the determination of a claim to real property.
18.

Section 152 of the N.Y. TAX LAW is an example of this.

19. "Stranger," as used here, is one having no legal or equitable interest in the
property involved.
20. People v. Campbell, 143 N.Y. 335, 38 N.E. 300 (1894).
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redemption.2 ' Since there is an addition of the words "or any person interested
in" in the Suffolk County Tax Act, the question is whether the court should
interpret it the same as the Campbell and Blatnicky cases,22 or restrict the
redemption completely to an owner or interested party. The Court has chosen
the former, holding that the addition of the words in question is merely an
intention of the legislature to stress the fact that a stranger could not redeem
in his own name for himself. Thus, the consequence of the payment by
plaintiff, before the redemption period ended, was a return of title to the estate
of Emma Gerow, thus enabling the estate to deed the property to plaintiff at a
later date.
The Court, in effect, holds that there is no difference between the two
statutes previously mentioned. This seems to be the logical conclusion when
considering the interests of the parties involved, for to hold otherwise
would create an unreasonable burden upon the County Treasurer to question
every payment tendered him in redemption after a tax sale, and to determine
whether the person so tendering payment has an interest in the property
23
involved
SUFFICIENCY OF POWER OF ATTORNEY TO SATISFY

BANK'S DUTY

TO DEPOSITOR

The courts of New York have long held that the relation between a bank
and its general depositors is that of debtor and creditor, the amount on deposit
representing an indebtedness by the bank to the depositor 2 4 When defendant
bank, in Romero v. Sjoberg,25 paid funds from the decedent's savings account
upon presentation of a power of attorney authorizing the holder to collect
the debts of the deceased, a unanimous Court of Appeals held the bank was
neither guilty of conversion by wrongful payment nor of failing to satisfy its
duty of due care.
It should be noted that appellant's was an appeal of right under Section
588 of the Civil Practice Act,2 6 since the Appellate Division had modified a
judgment of the trial court.2 7 The decision seems well grounded, the
debtor-creditor relation of bank and depositor being one of long standing,2 8
the power of attorney not seriously questioned at any stage of the proceeding.
21. Blatnicky v. Ciancimino, 2 N.Y.2d 943, 162 N.Y.S.2d 38 (1957).
22. See supra note 20, 21.
23. It should be noted that when property is sold at a tax sale, the purchaser does
not receive title, but only a tax certificate, which entitles him to legal and equitable
ownership of the land only if the taxes are not paid by some other party during the
period of redemption.
24. Sundail Construction Co. v. Liberty Bank of Buffalo, 277 N.Y. 137, 13 N.E.2d
745 (1938); Gibraltar Realty Corp. v. Mount Vernon Trust Co., 276 N.Y. 353, 12 N.E.2d
438 (1938); Critten v. Chemical National Bank, 171 N.Y. 219, 63 N.E. 969 (1902).
25. 5 N.Y.2d 518, 186 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1959).
26. Whenever the Appellate Division decision may be deemed a modification of the
trial court's judgment, an appeal is allowed under this section as a matter of right.
27. Here the Appellate Division had reversed a trial court dismissal against one of
two original defendants, not the defendant respondent. See: Zirn v. Bradley, 292 N.Y.
581, 54 N.E.2d 695 (1944); Unger v. Village of Falconer, 2 N.Y.2d 731, 157 N.Y.S.2d

371 (1956).
28. SuPra note 24.

